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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate secure communication over sparse millimeter-wave (mm-Wave) massive
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) channels by exploiting the spatial sparsity of legitimate user’s channel.
We propose a secure communication scheme in which information data is precoded onto dominant angle
components of the sparse channel through a limited number of radio-frequency (RF) chains, while artificial
noise (AN) is broadcast over the remaining nondominant angles interfering only with the eavesdropper with
a high probability. It is shown that the channel sparsity plays a fundamental role analogous to secret keys
in achieving secure communication. Hence, by defining two statistical measures of the channel sparsity, we
analytically characterize its impact on secrecy rate. In particular, a substantial improvement on secrecy rate can
be obtained by the proposed scheme due to the uncertainty, i.e., “entropy”, introduced by the channel sparsity
which is unknown to the eavesdropper. It is revealed that sparsity in the power domain can always contribute
to the secrecy rate. In contrast, in the angle domain, there exists an optimal level of sparsity that maximizes the
secrecy rate. The effectiveness of the proposed scheme and derived results are verified by numerical simulations.
Index Terms
Physical layer security, massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO), millimeter-wave (mm-Wave),
artificial noise (AN), radio-frequency (RF) chains.
2I. INTRODUCTION
Secure communication has recently attracted pervasive interest for safeguarding multifarious wireless
services in cellular networks. Traditionally, communication security is realized by cryptographic en-
cryption algorithms implemented at network and application layers [1]. These techniques are vulnerable
since they rely on the assumption that adversaries have limited computational ability. On the other hand,
it was discovered in [2] that in theory, perfect secrecy can be achieved at the physical layer, which
serves as a complement technology to conventional security methods.
In the past decade, physical layer security has attracted significant interests [3]-[8]. In [4], the well-
known wiretap channel model was studied by Wyner. In this model, the channel between the transmitter
and eavesdropper is assumed to be a degraded version of the channel between the transmitter and
legitimate user, guaranteeing a nonnegative secrecy capacity. Later in [5], the authors investigated
a general case where the two channels are independent. It was revealed that secure communication
is achievable if the capacity of the legitimate user’s channel is larger than that of the eavesdropper’s
channel. As a result, when the eavesdropper’s channel happens to be stronger than that of the legitimate
user’s channel, artificial noise (AN) has to be designed and exploited properly to guarantee secure
transmission [6]-[8]. More specifically, the AN in [6] was designed to be transmitted in the space
orthogonal to the legitimate user’s channel such that only the eavesdropper’s channel is impaired. The
authors of [7] then extended this orthogonal AN design to scenarios with multiple eavesdroppers. In
addition, a joint design of AN and information carrying signals was studied in [8].
With the recent development of multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) techniques, physical layer
security in the context of massive MIMO systems has been intensively investigated, e.g., [9]-[15]. The
authors of [11] investigated secure transmission strategies when an active eavesdropper is present in
a multiuser massive MIMO system. In [12], secure communication using maximal-ratio-transmission
(MRT) precoding was studied for a multi-cell massive MIMO network. Then, in [13], the authors
further studied the secrecy performance adopting more sophisticated precoding schemes, i.e., zero-
forcing (ZF), regularized channel inversion (RCI), and collaborative ZF/RCI precoders. The impacts of
low-resolution digital-to-analog converters (DACs) and spatial channel correlation on secure massive
MIMO communications were respectively studied in [14] and [15].
Along with massive MIMO, millimeter-wave (mm-Wave) communication also has been recognized
as a promising solution to realizing ultra-high data rates for next-generation wireless networks, e.g.,
[16]-[20]. Its applications to guarantee communication security have attracted significant attentions
3[21]-[25]. Particularly in [21], a low-complexity directional modulation technique was developed for
point-to-point secure mm-Wave communications. In [22], a wireless transmission architecture, referred
to as a switched phased-array (SPA), was proposed for mm-Wave systems to enhance physical layer
security. The authors of [23] analyzed the outage probability of secure communication in a mm-Wave
overlaid microwave network in the presence of blockages. The performance in terms of network-
wide physical layer security was studied in [24] for downlink transmission in a mm-Wave cellular
network. Moreover in [25], the impacts of AN, blockages, and antenna gains on the system secrecy
performance were characterized for a mm-Wave ad-hoc network. Unlike conventionally adopted sub-6
GHz frequency bands in current cellular applications, mm-Wave channels are in general dominated
by line-of-sight (LoS) components [26], [27]. In other words, spatial sparsity commonly exists in
mm-Wave channels leading to new challenges in designing efficient communication systems [28]-[30].
However, from the perspective of physical layer security, the sparsity of mm-Wave channels can be
exploited to provide potential benefits. Specifically, the sparsity of the legitimate user’s channel depends
on certain parameters, such as the angles of the dominant propagation directions which are unknown
to eavesdroppers. This channel-specific sparsity information can be leveraged as an implicit secret key
which reduces the leakage of private information to potential eavesdroppers.
To the best of our knowledge, most existing works (e.g., [9]-[15], [21]-[25]) have studied secrecy
performance for massive MIMO communications from the viewpoint of time and frequency domains.
However, the impact of channel sparsity has rarely been investigated. In this paper, we investigate
secure massive MIMO communications over spatially sparse mm-Wave channels and propose a secure
transmission scheme implemented in angle domain. By exploiting the sparsity pattern of the legitimate
user’s channel, confidential signals are transmitted over the dominant angular directions via a limited
number of radio-frequency (RF) chains. Secure communication is guaranteed by injecting AN into
the remaining nondominant propagation angles. In practice, the dominant propagation angles of the
legitimate user’s channel are different from that of the eavesdropper, and hence, the AN would cause
less interference at the desired user but significant interference at the eavesdropper. Based on our
derived expressions of the secrecy rate, we quantitatively characterize the impact of channel sparsity
on the system secrecy rate. The main contributions of our work are summarized as follows.
1) We show that the secrecy rate of mm-Wave massive MIMO systems can benefit from channel
sparsity. This benefit is quantitatively characterized in closed-form as an additive secrecy rate bonus
which can be interpreted as sparsity information. In particular, we propose two metrics, χL and χH,
4for analyzing the impact of channel sparsity on the secrecy rate. For low signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs),
the secrecy rate bonus is Mt log2 χL bits/s/Hz, where Mt is the number of RF chains employed at the
transmitter, χL(ρ, η) , η
ρ−1 [η + (1− η)ρ] is a measure of channel sparsity while ρ and η represent,
respectively, the sparsity in the angle domain and sparsity in the power domain. For high SNRs, the
secrecy rate bonus equals Mt log2 χH bits/s/Hz where χH(ρ, η) , η
ρ−2 [η + (1− η)ρ]
(
1− Mr
Nt(1−ρ)
)−1
,
Nt is the number of antennas at the transmitter, and Mr is the number of RF chains at the legitimate
user.
2) We analyze the effect of channel sparsity on secrecy rate from two perspectives, i.e., the values
of ρ and η in the angle and power domains, respectively. The smaller the values of ρ and η are, the
sparser the channel is. From the derived expressions of χL and χH, we observe that the secrecy rate
first increases and then decreases with ρ. The maximum secrecy rate is achieved by a specific sparsity
value in the angle domain given by ρ∗ = − 1
ln η
− η
1−η for a fixed η. On the other hand, the secrecy
rate monotonically decreases with η, which implies that channel sparsity in the power domain always
benefits the secrecy rate of the system.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The channel model is introduced and the secure
communication scheme is presented in Section II. In Section III, we derive the ergodic achievable
secrecy rate in the context of massive MIMO. Two upper bounds for the secrecy rate are obtained in
Section IV, based on which we quantitatively characterize the effect of channel sparsity. Simulation
results are presented in Section V and conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
Notation: AT , A∗, and AH represent the transpose, conjugate, and conjugate transpose of A,
respectively. a ∼ CN (0,Σ) denotes a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian vector with zero mean
and covarianceΣ. [A(i, j)](i,j)∈S represents a matrix consisting of elements inA with indices belonging
to S while [a(i)]i∈S represents a vector consisting of elements in a with indices belonging to S. Tr(A)
and |A| are respectively the trace and determinant of A. E{·} is the expectation operator. a.s.−−→ denotes
almost sure convergence. [x]+ = max{0, x} returns the maximum of 0 and x.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a mm-Wave massive MIMO network, as depicted in Fig. 1, where the transmitter (Alice),
legitimate user (Bob), and passive eavesdropper (Eve) possess Nt, Nr, and Ne antennas, respectively.
The devices are respectively equipped with Mt, Mr, and Me RF chains, where we generally have
Mt ≤ Nt, Mr ≤ Nr, and Me ≤ Ne in typical massive MIMO communication systems [31]. Note that
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Fig. 1. System block diagram with a transmitter (Alice) communicating with a legitimate receiver (Bob) in the existence of a potential
eavesdropper (Eve).
a hybrid architecture is implemented at Alice, including a digital precoder W and an analog precoder
AT .
A. Channel Model
In order to express the channel using the angle domain decomposition [32], we define the array
response matrices at Alice and Bob respectively as AT =
1√
Nt
[
aT
(
θ¯T,1
)
, ..., aT
(
θ¯T,Nt
)]
and AR=
1√
Nr
[
aR
(
θ¯R,1
)
, ..., aR
(
θ¯R,Nr
)]
, where aT (θ¯T,j) = [1, e
−j2piϑ¯T,j , ..., e−j2pi(Nt−1)ϑ¯T,j ]T and aR(θ¯R,i) =
[1, e−j2piϑ¯R,i , ..., e−j2pi(Nr−1)ϑ¯R,i]T . Variables θ¯T,j=arcsin
(
λϑ¯T,j
d
)
and θ¯R,i=arcsin
(
λϑ¯R,i
d
)
are respectively
the angle-of-departure (AOD) and angle-of-arrival (AOA) corresponding to uniformly spaced spatial
angles ϑ¯T,j =
j−1−(Nt−1)/2
Nt
and ϑ¯R,i =
i−1−(Nr−1)/2
Nr
. Parameter d is the distance between adjacent
antennas and λ is the wavelength of the information carrier frequency. Then, the flat fading channel
from Alice to Bob can be expressed as [32]
G˜ =
1√
NrNt
Nr∑
i=1
Nt∑
j=1
G(i, j)aR(θ¯R,i)a
H
T (θ¯T,j) =ARGA
H
T , (1)
where G ∈ CNr×Nt is usually called the equivalent virtual channel representation [33]. Since AR and
AT are unitary discrete Fourier transform (DFT) matrices, we have G = A
H
R G˜AT .
For the mm-Wave massive MIMO channel, sparsity implies that there are only a few significant
non-zero coefficients in the virtual channel matrix G, which we refer to as dominant beams [34].
6According to [35], a low-dimensional virtual representation of the channel is available if the channel
sparsity is present. Let U denote the selection mask which contains all the indices of the dominant
beams in G. The low-dimensional virtual representation of the channel is defined as
Gl = [G(i, j)](i,j)∈U ∈ CLr×Lt , (2)
where Lr and Lt represent the numbers of dominant beams from the view of Bob and Alice, re-
spectively. Assuming that we exploit fewer RF chains than the number of dominant beams1, we have
Mt ≤ Lt ≤ Nt and Mr ≤ Lr ≤ Nr.
Similarly, the virtual channel matrix for Eve is given by
H = AHE H˜AT , (3)
where H˜ ∈ CNe×Nt is the flat fading channel between Alice and Eve, and AE = 1√Ne
[
aE
(
θ¯E,1
)
, ...,
aE
(
θ¯E,Ne
)]
is the array response matrix at Eve with aE(θ¯E,i)=[1, e
−j2piϑ¯E,i, ..., e−j2pi(Ne−1)ϑ¯E,i]T , θ¯E,i =
arcsin
(
λϑ¯E,i
d
)
, and ϑ¯E,i =
i−1−(Ne−1)/2
Ne
. Then, the corresponding low-dimensional virtual channel is
Hl = [H(i, j)](i,j)∈E ∈ CLe×Lt , (4)
where E , analogous to U for G, denotes the selection mask of H and Le is the number of dominant
receive beams at Eve. Similar to Lt and Lr, we have Me ≤ Le ≤ Ne.
B. Secure Transmission over a Sparse Channel
Due to the limited number of RF chains exploited at Alice, Bob, and Eve, it is necessary to first
choose a subset of the beam directions before transmission over these RF chains. Similar to [34]
and [35], the statistical channel state information (CSI) for G, in the term of the sparsity pattern U ,
is assumed to be known to Alice and Bob for beam selection before data transmission. Also, Eve
is assumed to know only the statistical CSI for H, in the form of the sparsity pattern E , for beam
selection. Estimation of this type of statistical channel information has been studied in a number of
papers such as [36]-[38] for mm-Wave channels. Given the independence of the channels from Alice
to Bob and Eve [12]-[14], the sparsity patterns, U and E , are assumed to be distinct. By exploiting
the mismatch between U and E , we propose a secure communication scheme in which confidential
1If there are more RF chains than dominant beams, a cost-effective way is to exploit the same number of RF chains as dominant
beams, i.e., Mt = Lt and Mr = Lr .
7signals are aligned with the dominant beams of G while AN is sent over its nondominant beams. From
the perspective of Eve, however, the confidential signals and AN are randomly transmitted through
the dominant and nondominant beams of H. In this way, the channel of Eve is deliberately degraded
and secure communication can be achieved. For detection, however, it is generally possible to acquire
fairly accurate instantaneous CSI of the selected sub-channels through channel estimation [6], [12].
The instantaneous CSI can be estimated by exploiting channel training via pilots.
A description of this scheme is depicted in Fig. 1. Let s ∈ CNs×1 denote the normalized confidential
signals for Bob. The transmitter first generates x˜V = Ws ∈ CMt×1 by using precoding matrix W ∈
CMt×Ns . Then, the precoded signal x˜V goes through a beam selector to form a virtual signal vector,
xV ∈ CNt×1, where AN is also included to combat the channel quality of Eve. Given U = {(i, j)|i ∈
Ur, j ∈ Ut}, where Ur and Ut are respectively the sets of indices of the dominant receive and transmit
beam directions, xV is generated as
[xV (j)] =

x˜V , j ∈ U¯t,
nAN , j /∈ Ut,
0, j ∈ Ut, j /∈ U¯t,
(5)
where nAN ∈ C(Nt−Lt)×1 is the AN and U¯t is a subset of Ut with size Mt. Considering that only Ut
is available at Alice, it is natural to randomly select a subset of U¯t from Ut. Then, the transmit signal,
x ∈ CNt×1, is finally obtained as
x = ATxV , (6)
where AT is the analog precoder. The transmit power of x is limited by P , i.e., Tr
(
E
{
xxH
})
=
Tr
(
E
{
xV x
H
V
})
= Tr
(
E
{
x˜V x˜
H
V
})
+Tr
(
E
{
nANn
H
AN
})
= P . Denoting by φ the proportion of power
allocated for confidential signals, we have
Tr
(
E
{
x˜V x˜
H
V
})
= φP, (7)
Tr
(
E
{
nANn
H
AN
})
= (1− φ)P. (8)
At Bob, the received signal is given by
y = G˜x+ n, (9)
8where n ∼ CN (0, σ2nINr) is the thermal noise. Applying the receive analog decoder AHR and substi-
tuting (1) and (6) into (9) yields
yV = A
H
Ry = GxV + nV , (10)
where we define nV , A
H
Rn ∼ CN (0, σ2nINr) because AHR is a unitary matrix. Since there are onlyMr
RF chains, we adopt a beam selector, represented by a selection mask U¯r ⊆ Ur, to randomly choose
Mr from the Lr dominant receive beams. From (5) and (10), we obtain the signals for detection as
y˜V = [yV (i)]i∈U¯r = G¯x˜V + GˆnAN + n˜V , (11)
where G¯ = [G(i, j)]i∈U¯r ,j∈U¯t ∈ CMr×Mt and Gˆ = [G(i, j)]i∈U¯r,j /∈Ut ∈ CMr×(Nt−Lt) are submatrices of
G, and n˜V = [nV (i)]i∈U¯r ∈ CMr×1.
The expression in (11) implies that the information carrying signal, x˜V , is transmitted through the
dominant beams in G¯ while the AN, nAN , is sent via the nondominant beams. From [39], it has been
shown that the channel coefficients in G¯ are approximately equal to the sum of the complex gains of
a set of physical paths. When there are a sufficiently large number of paths, each entry of G¯ tends to
behave as a complex Gaussian random variable due to the Central Limit Theorem [32]. Assuming that
distinct channel coefficients correspond to approximately disjoint subsets of paths and that the path
gains are statistically independent, we assume that the entries of G¯ are statistically independent. For
example, the channel measurements in [40] showed an average number of 10 distinct clusters and 9
rays in each cluster for a practical 60 GHz mmWave communication scenario. Thus, it is reasonable
to approximate the elements of G¯ by zero-mean independent complex Gaussian variables [34], [35],
as further validated by the experimental measurement results in [41]. Without loss of generality, we
assume that long-term power control is employed to compensate for the large-scale fading of Bob
such that the entries of G¯ have unit variance. Similarly, the entries of Gˆ are modeled by independent
complex Gaussian variables with zero mean and variance η. In general, the nondominant channel
coefficients in Gˆ experience a small gain in the power domain. Since the variance of the dominant
coefficients in G¯ is modeled unit, we assume that η ∈ (0, 1).
At Eve, the receive signal vector can be expressed as
yE,V = A
H
E H˜x +A
H
EnE = HxV +A
H
EnE , (12)
where nE ∼ CN (0, σ2eINe) denotes the thermal noise at Eve. To guarantee secure transmission in the
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Fig. 2. Confidential signals and AN on low-dimensional virtual channels with Nt = Nr = Ne = 10.
worst case, σ2e is assumed to be small enough so that nE can be ignored in the sequel [13]. Given Me
RF chains at Eve, a beam selector E¯r ⊆ Er is used to randomly choose Me dominant receive beams
from Er, where Er = {i|(i, j) ∈ E} contains all the dominant receive beams at Eve. Substituting (5)
into (12), the low-dimensional signal vector after beam selection equals
y˜E,V = [yE,V (i)]i∈E¯r = H¯x˜V + HˆnAN , (13)
where H¯ = [H(i, j)]i∈E¯r ,j∈U¯t ∈ CMe×Mt and Hˆ = [H(i, j)]i∈E¯r ,j /∈Ut ∈ CMe×(Nt−Lt). Similarly, we
assume that [H(i, j)]i∈E¯r ,j∈Et ∼ CN (0, I) and [H(i, j)]i∈E¯r ,j /∈Et ∼ CN (0, ηI), where Et = {j|(i, j) ∈ E}
contains all the dominant transmit beams of H.
Unlike Bob, the confidential signals in (13) are likely to be allocated on nondominant beams for
the Eve’s channel, while AN would likely spread over dominant beams. This mismatch between the
channel sparsity patterns U and E can be exploited to degrade Eve’s capacity.
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C. An Illustrative Example
Fig. 2 shows two examples of the proposed scheme. In Fig. 2(a), we present an example of a special
case where the number of RF chains is exactly the same as the number of dominant beams in the
channel, i.e., Mt = Mr = Me = Lt = Lr = Le = 6 for illustration. At Alice, the dominant beams are
used for transmitting confidential signals, x˜k, k ∈ {1, ..., 6}, to Bob. The AN, nk, k ∈ {1, ..., 4}, is
sent through the nondominant beams of G. For Eve, mismatches exist because the sparsity patterns
of G and H are distinct (the mismatches are indicated in Fig. 2(a) by dashed arrows). Specifically,
signals {x˜1, ..., x˜4} are transmitted over nondominant beams of H, therefore it is challenging for Eve
to wiretap the information signals. On the other hand, AN {n1, ..., n4} is sent through the dominant
beams of H, which causes significant interference to Eve but not to Bob. Using this proposed scheme,
the capacity of Eve’s channel degrades significantly resulting in a potential increase in the secrecy rate.
In general, dominant beams can be dispersive in the angular directions. Also, the number of RF
chains for signal transmission and reception can be different from the number of dominant beams.
Fig. 2(b) shows a general scenario, e.g., with Mt = Mr = Me = 4 and Lt = Lr = Le = 6. The beam
selectors are U¯r = {2, 5, 8, 9} ⊂ Ur = {2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10}, U¯t = {2, 3, 6, 9} ⊂ Ut = {2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10},
E¯r = {2, 4, 8, 10} ⊂ Er = {1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 10}, and Et = {2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10}. Unlike Fig. 2(a), neither signal
nor noise is transmitted over the 7th and 10th dominant beams because of the limited number of RF
chains. The confidential signals and AN are allocated based on the sparsity pattern of G, which is
unknown to Eve. Therefore, the sparsity acts analogously to a secret key which is beneficial for secure
communication.
III. SECRECY RATE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the ergodic achievable secrecy rate of the considered mm-Wave massive
MIMO system. From [5], [42], the secrecy capacity is given by
CS = max
s→x˜V→y˜V ,y˜E,V
I
(
s; y˜V
)
− I
(
s; y˜E,V
)
, (14)
where I(·; ·) denotes the mutual information between two random variables. The secrecy capacity CS
is given by maximizing over all joint distributions such that a Markov chain s → x˜V → y˜V , y˜E,V
is formed. Assuming that only statistical CSI of G is known to Alice, the digital precoder is chosen
as W =
√
φP
Mt
IMt with Mt = Ns [34], [35], guaranteeing the power constraint in (7). For the sake
11
of tractability, we then follow the definition of ergodic achievable secrecy rate in [12, Lemma 1] and
derive an expression for the secrecy rate under the assumption of large Nt.
Theorem 1. Under the assumptions of Gaussian transmit signalling, s, and large antenna arrays, the
ergodic achievable secrecy rate of Bob is
RS = [RU − CE]+, (15)
where RU is the ergodic achievable rate of Bob given by
RU = Mt log2
[
1 +
MrφP
Mtσ2n
(
1− F(α, β)
4αβ
)]
, (16)
and CE is the ergodic capacity of Eve
CE =
LtMt
Nt
log2
(
1+
φ(Nt − Lt)Me
(1− φ)Mt(a−Me)b
)
+
(Nt − Lt)Mt
Nt
log2
(
1+
φ(Nt − Lt)Meη
(1− φ)Mt(a−Me)b
)
, (17)
where we define
α ,
(1− φ)ηP
σ2n
, (18)
β ,
Mr
Nt − Lt , (19)
F(x, y) ,
(√
x(1 +
√
y)2 + 1−
√
x(1 −√y)2 + 1
)2
, (20)
a ,
[Lt + η(Nt − Lt)]2 (Nt − Lt)
Nt [Lt + η2(Nt − Lt)] , (21)
b ,
Lt + η
2(Nt − Lt)
Lt + η(Nt − Lt) . (22)
Proof. See Appendix B.
From (15), at first glance the effects of Lt, η, φ on the secrecy rate performance are quite complicated.
In order to obtain useful insights for system design, we further characterize the asymptotic behaviour
of Rs. To this end, we first present some asymptotic results for RU and CE
12
propositions. For notational brevity, we introduce
ρ ,
Lt
Nt
(23)
to represent the proportion of dominant beams from the point-of-view of Alice.
Proposition 1. At low SNR, the ergodic achievable rate of Bob in (16) can be expressed as
RU ≈Mt log2
(
1 +
MrφP
Mtσ2n
)
, RLU . (24)
Proof. We consider a low SNR case, i.e., P ≪ σ2n, which is a typical scenario in many mm-Wave
massive MIMO applications [43], [44]. Using (20), it follows that
F(α, β)
4αβ
=
1
4β
(√(
1+
√
β
)2
+
1
α
−
√(
1−
√
β
)2
+
1
α
)2
≈ 0, (25)
where we use α≪ 1 from (18) for 1− φ < 1, η < 1, and P ≪ σ2n. By substituting (25) into (16), the
achievable rate of Bob in (24) is directly obtained.
Remark 1. According to (5), confidential signals are transmitted over Mt dominant beams while
AN is sent over Nt − Lt nondominant beams from Alice to Bob. The sparser the channel is, i.e.,
for a smaller Lt, AN is transmitted on a larger set of nondominant beams. Then, the AN leakage to
Bob statistically becomes larger which decreases the rate of Bob as observed in (16). However, this
impairment is relatively weak in the low SNR regime. Observing (24), the ergodic achievable rate
of Bob increases with the number of RF chains, Mr, and the SNR,
P
σ2n
, regardless of the number of
dominant beams, Lt, because the achievable rate is dominated by thermal noise, instead of AN in the
low SNR regime.
Proposition 2. At high SNR, the ergodic achievable rate of Bob in (16) can be expressed as
RU ≈Mt log2
1 + Mrφ
Mt(1− φ)η
(
1− Mr
Nt(1−ρ)
)
 , RHU . (26)
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Proof. Using (20) with ν , 1
α
, we define
G(ν, β) , F(1/ν, β)
4β/ν
=
1
4β
(√(
1+
√
β
)2
+ ν−
√(
1−
√
β
)2
+ ν
)2
. (27)
For high SNR with P ≫ σ2n, i.e., ν ≪ 1 using (18), applying a Taylor series expansion yields
G(ν, β) = G|ν=0 + ∂G
∂ν
∣∣∣
ν=0
ν + o(ν) = 1− ν
1− β + o(ν), (28)
where o(ν) is an insignificant higher-order term with respect to (w.r.t.) ν and we set ν = 0 in
∂G
∂ν
=
−
(√(
1+
√
β
)2
+ ν−
√(
1−√β)2 + ν)2
4β
√(
1+
√
β
)2
+ ν
√(
1−√β)2 + ν . (29)
By substituting (27) and (28) into (16), it follows that
RU = Mt log2
(
1 +
MrφP
Mtσ2n
[
ν
1− β − o(ν)
])
≈Mt log2
(
1 +
MrφPν
Mtσ2n(1− β)
)
. (30)
We complete the proof by substituting (18), (19), and (23) into (30).
Remark 2. From (26), RHU increases with ρ, which coincides with the intuition that the presence
of more dominant beams is beneficial to the rate of Bob without considering security. On the other
hand, it is observed from (26) that RHU decreases with η. A larger η means that the nondominant
beams degrade less significantly compared to the dominant ones, which results in exceeding large AN
interference to Bob. Unlike the low SNR case in (24), RHU is eventually limited by an upper bound
with increasing SNR because the interference caused by AN dominates the thermal noise at high SNR.
The above two propositions characterize the asymptotic rate of Bob. In order to analyze the asymp-
totic behaviour of the ergodic achievable secrecy rate, we also need the following proposition that
reveals the asymptotic ergodic capacity of Eve.
Proposition 3. Under the assumption of large antenna arrays with Nt ≫ Me, the ergodic capacity of
Eve in (17) can be expressed as
CE=Mtρ log2
(
1 +
φMe
(1−φ)Mt [ρ+ η(1− ρ)]
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
+Mt(1−ρ) log2
(
1+
φMeη
(1−φ)Mt[ρ+ η(1− ρ)]
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
. (31)
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Proof. Substituting (21), (22), and (23) into (17), we have
CE=Mtρ log2
1 + φMe
(1− φ)Mt
(
ρ+ η(1− ρ)− Me[ρ+η2(1−ρ)]
Nt(1−ρ)[ρ+η(1−ρ)]
)

+Mt(1− ρ) log2
1+ φMeη
(1− φ)Mt
(
ρ+ η(1− ρ)− Me[ρ+η2(1−ρ)]
Nt(1−ρ)[ρ+η(1−ρ)]
)
 . (32)
For Nt ≫Me, it follows that Me[ρ+η2(1−ρ)]Nt(1−ρ)[ρ+η(1−ρ)] → 0. Substituting this into (32) yields (31).
In (31), the term T1 corresponds to the capacity component contributed by the dominant transmit
beams for Eve’s channel, while T2 corresponds to that of the nondominant beams. The effect of ρ
within the logarithmic function represents the impact of channel sparsity on the equivalent SNR. From
the denominator in (31), (1−φ)Mt [ρ+ η(1− ρ)], we observe that a proportion, ρ, of AN is transmitted
over the dominant beams while the rest 1−ρ is sent through the nondominant beams which experience
a degraded channel gain η.
Moreover, from (31), we observe that CE first decreases and then increases with ρ. This indicates
that compared to non-sparse channels with ρ = 1, the sparsity degrades the ergodic capacity of Eve
because the confidential signals are likely to be sent through the nondominant beams of the sparse
channel. However, when the channel is even sparser with a small ρ, i.e., Lt →Mt, the ergodic capacity
of Eve increases slightly. This is because there are insufficient dominant beams for transmitting AN
which reduces the effectiveness of the AN for combating the channel of Eve.
IV. EFFECTS OF SPARSITY ON SECRECY RATE
This section presents two tight bounds for the ergodic achievable secrecy rate in (15) using Proposi-
tions 1-3. The derived bounds allow us to quantitatively characterize the effects of the channel sparsity
on the proposed secure mm-Wave MIMO system.
A. New Definitions of Statistics of Channel Sparsity
In order to characterize the effect of channel sparsity on secrecy rate, we need to find an effective
way of quantitatively measuring the sparsity. In our study, we model the degrees of spatial sparsity
from two aspects. The first one measures the sparsity in the angle domain, ρ, while the other measures
the sparsity in the power domain, η. The former ρ = Lt
Nt
measures the number of dominant beams
Lt ∈ [Mt, Nt], quantifying how sparse the spatial channel is. If the channel gain of the nondominant
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beams is weak and can be neglected, then ρ represents the available degrees of freedom in Bob’s
channel. More specifically, when ρ → Mt
Nt
(Lt → Mt), the channel is severely sparse and the RF
chains connect with almost all the dominant beams. On the other hand, when ρ→ 1 (Lt → Nt), the
sparsity is insignificant and only a small proportion of the dominant beams are connected to the RF
chains. The other sparsity indicator η ∈ (0, 1) quantifies how much the nondominant beams differ from
the dominant ones in the power domain. When η → 0, the sparsity is severe, while for η → 1, the
sparsity is much less pronounced. From the derived results, we find it useful to define new metrics,
χL and χH, as two effective measures of the channel sparsity for analyzing the secrecy rate. Since the
two metrics are directly connected to the quantitative effect of channel sparsity on secrecy rate, we
first present their definitions as well as some properties in the following.
Definition 1. The terms
χL(ρ, η) , η
ρ−1 [η + (1− η)ρ] , (33)
and
χH(ρ, η) , η
ρ−2 [η + (1− η)ρ]
(
1− Mr
Nt(1− ρ)
)−1
, (34)
are defined as quantitative measures of sparsity for low and high SNRs, respectively.
The contribution of channel sparsity to the secrecy rate is determined solely by χL and χH for low
and high SNRs, respectively. Comparing χH in (34) to χL in (33), we find that
χH(ρ, η) =
1
η
χL(ρ, η), (35)
which comes from the fact that Mr
Nt(1−ρ) ≈ 0 for large Nt and a small-to-moderate value of ρ. This is
reasonable because at low SNR, the achievable rate is mainly determined by the thermal noise while
at high SNR the dominating interference is due to AN which experiences a channel gain of η.
In the next subsection, we will show that the ergodic achievable secrecy rate is an increasing function
of χL (χH) and the effects of channel sparsity on the secrecy rate are therefore completely determined
by the metrics χL and χH.
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B. Effects of Channel Sparsity
Given the above definitions, in the following theorem we characterize the effects of channel sparsity
on the secrecy rate by deriving two bounds for the ergodic achievable secrecy rate in (15) at low and
high SNRs.
Theorem 2. Assuming the existence of a powerful Eve with Me ≫ Mt, the upper bounds for the
ergodic achievable secrecy rate at low and high SNRs are, respectively,
R¯LS =Mt
[
log2
(
1 +
MrφP
Mtσ2n
)
− log2
(
φMe
(1− φ)Mt
)
+ log2 χL
]+
, (36)
and
R¯HS =Mt
[
log2
(
Mr
Me
)
+ log2 χH
]+
. (37)
Proof. See Appendix C.
In (36), the first term in the brackets represents the ergodic achievable rate of Bob, the second
term represents the ergodic capacity of Eve without consideration of the sparsity, and the third term
captures the additional secrecy rate bonus due to exploiting the sparsity. Similarly, the first term in
the bracket in (37) represents the ergodic achievable secrecy rate without sparsity and the second term
represents the secrecy rate bonus due to spatial sparsity. Using (33) and (34), it can be easily verified
that χH > χL ≥ 1 for ρ ∈
[
Mt
Lt
, 1
]
and η ∈ (0, 1). Hence, the secrecy rate bonus is always nonnegative.
From Theorem 2, it is generally difficult to give an exact elaboration on the secrecy rate bonus
of the proposed secure transmission scheme. Here, we give an intuitive description from the view
of uncertainty, i.e., “entropy”, in terms of channel sparsity. In mmWave secure communication, it is
intuitive to interpret the secrecy rate bonus of the proposed scheme as coming mainly from the mismatch
between the sparsity patterns U and E . For each RF chain at Alice, the transmit beam direction may
differ in the beam types for Bob and Eve, i.e., dominant beams aligned with one terminal may serve as
nondominant beams for the other. Assuming an equal probability of a match or mismatch for each pair
of transmit beams, we can interpret this probability as 1
χL
and 1
χH
for low and high SNRs respectively.
Then, the corresponding secrecy rate bonus, Mt log2(χL) and Mt log2(χH), represents the additional
uncertainty contributed by channel sparsity.
On the other hand, for fixed system parameters including the number of RF chains, system SNR, and
φ, Theorem 2 implies that the ergodic achievable secrecy rate depends only on sparsity parameters ρ
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and η. The following theorem quantitatively characterizes the difference in secrecy rate due to channels
with different levels of sparsity.
Corollary 1. For two channels with respective sparsity parameters (ρ1, η1) and (ρ2, η2), the ergodic
achievable secrecy rate gap between the two channels is, for low SNR,
∆RLS(ρ1, η1; ρ2, η2) = Mt log2
χL(ρ1, η1)
χL(ρ2, η2)
, (38)
and for high SNR,
∆RHS (ρ1, η1; ρ2, η2) = Mt log2
χH(ρ1, η1)
χH(ρ2, η2)
. (39)
The accuracy of Corollary 1 will be verified by numerical results in Section V. From (38) and
(39), the proposed metrics χL and χH accurately evaluate the secrecy rate gap for two different sparse
channels.
C. Optimal Sparsity
In the following, we discuss the effect of the sparsity parameters, ρ and η, on χL and χH, which
equivalently describes their impact on the ergodic achievable secrecy rate.
1) Effect of ρ: When the difference between the nondominant and dominant beams is insignificant
for large η → 1, the effect of the proportion of the dominant beams, i.e., ρ, on the secrecy rate is not
pronounced. On the other hand, for small η → 0, the nondominant beams differ significantly from the
dominant ones and thus the effect of ρ is pronounced. From the definitions in (33) and (34), we show
that there exists a value of the sparsity parameter ρ that maximizes the secrecy rate of the system. In
order to analyze the effect of ρ on the secrecy rate in the angle domain, we consider the following
optimization problem
max
ρ
R¯LS
(
R¯HS
)
= max
ρ
χL (χH) , (40)
where we exploit the fact that R¯LS and R¯
H
S monotonically increase with χL and χH, respectively. The
closed-form solution to (40) is given in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. The optimal ρ∗ which maximizes χL (χH) is
ρ∗ = − 1
ln η
− η
1− η , (41)
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and the optimal L∗t can be obtained by using the relationship between ρ
∗ and L∗t in (23).
Proof. See Appendix D.
Note that the optimal ρ∗ in (41) depends only on η. In order to characterize the effect of η on ρ∗,
we derive that
∂ρ∗
∂η
=
(
η−
1
2 − η 12 + ln η
)(
η−
1
2 − η 12 − ln η
)
[(1− η) ln η]2 > 0, (42)
where we use the fact that η−
1
2 − η 12 − ln η > η− 12 − η 12 + ln η > 0 for η ∈ (0, 1). This implies that ρ∗
increases with η. As the channel gain of the nondominant beams increases in the power domain, the
optimal number of nondominant beams correspondingly decreases in the angle domain. In this way,
any of the nondominant beams can produce nearly the same effect on the secure communication.
2) Effect of η: At Bob, the AN experiences a degraded channel gain of η over the nondominant
beams while for Eve, both confidential information and AN is transmitted over nondominant beams.
In order to analyze the effect of η on the secrecy rate, i.e., on χL (χH), we focus on the derivatives of
χL and χH w.r.t. η as follows
∂χL
∂η
= −(1− ρ)ρ(1− η)ηρ−2 < 0, (43)
∂χH
∂η
=
[
ρ(ρ− 2)− η(ρ− 1)2] ηρ−3(1− Mr
Nt(1− ρ)
)−1
< 0, (44)
where we apply (33) and (34) and consider ρ < 1 − Mr
Nt
for common sparse scenarios. This implies
that both χL and χH decrease slightly with η. Given a larger η, it is easier for Eve to wiretap the
confidential information even though it is transmitted over nondominant beams, leading to a lower
secrecy rate.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we verify the derived results including Theorems 1-2, Propositions 1-3, and Corol-
lary 1 under various system parameters. In the numerical simulations, we set Nr = Ne = Nt and
Lr = Le = Lt, and denote γ0 ,
P
σ2n
as the system SNR.
Fig. 3 verifies the accuracy of the derived rate expression for different values of Lt versus SNR.
Dotted markers correspond to numerical results while solid lines correspond to the derived theoretical
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Fig. 3. Ergodic achievable secrecy rate versus SNR with various Lt (Nt = 128, Mt = 4, Mr = Me = 16, φ = 0.6, and η = 0.1).
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Fig. 4. Ergodic achievable secrecy rate versus Mt with various SNRs (Nt = 256, Lt = 28, Mr = Me = 20, φ = 0.6, and η = 0.1).
expression in (15). We observe that the ergodic achievable secrecy rate increases with γ0 and, as
expected, finally becomes saturated at high SNR due to the effect of AN. Also, the figure shows
that a smaller Lt achieves higher secrecy rate, which coincides with the theoretical observation in
Section IV.C that slight sparsity in the angle domain improves the secrecy rate. Fig. 4 shows the effect
of Mt on the ergodic achievable secrecy rate given the sparsity parameters ρ =
Lt
Nt
= 28
256
and η = 0.1.
We observe that the secrecy rate monotonically increases with Mt for the considered SNRs, γ0 = 6, 7,
and 8 dB. This is because deploying more RF chains can achieve higher beamforming gain in massive
MIMO systems, although the large number of RF chains can significantly increase the circuit power
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Fig. 5. Ergodic achievable secrecy rate versus Me with various SNRs (Nt = 256, Lt = 28, Mt = 4, Mr = 16, φ = 0.6, and η = 0.1).
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Fig. 6. Percentage of leakage power to transmit power P versus φ (Nt = 128, Lt = Lr = Le = 88, Mt = 4, and Mr = Me = 16).
consumption. The effect of increasing the number of RF chains at Eve on the secrecy rate is shown
in Fig. 5. It is observed that the secrecy rate monotonically decreases with an increasing Me for the
considered SNRs, γ0 = 6, 7, and 8 dB. This is because more degrees of freedom are introduced by a
large number of RF chains at Eve which facilitates a more efficient eavesdropping.
From Figs. 3-5, it can be observed that the numerical results of the ergodic achievable secrecy rate
is slightly higher than our theoretical analysis in Theorem 1, especially when the condition Mt ≪Mr
holds. The expression in Theorem 1 is therefore verified to be a lower bound on the ergodic achievable
secrecy rate, which certainly serves as a lower bound on the ergodic secrecy capacity.
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Fig. 7. Performance comparison between random and optimal beam selections with statistical and instantaneous CSI (Mt = Mr =
Me = 32, Lt = 40, φ = 0.6, and η = 0.1).
Fig. 6 shows the percentage of leakage power to total transmit power P , including the leakage
power of AN to Bob and the leakage power of information to Eve. Obviously, the AN leakage power
decreases proportionally with the power allocation parameter φ, while the information leakage power
increases with φ. When the channel gain of the nondominant beams, η, increases, the AN leakage
power increases significantly because the AN is leaked to Bob over these nondominant beams. On the
other hand, the information leakage power only slightly increases with η because the information is
eavesdropped by Eve over both dominant and nondominant beams.
In general, it is difficult to estimate the instantaneous information of the entire channel matrix due
to the fact that only a limited number of RF chains are available. Thus, statistical CSI in terms of
the sparsity patterns, i.e., U and E , is assumed known for beam selection. With statistical CSI, the
transmitter and receiver randomly choose a subset of beams from the dominant channel directions in
U and E . If instantaneous CSI were available at the transceiver, the optimal subset of dominant beams
could be chosen to maximize the achievable secrecy rate. Fig. 7 compares the ergodic achievable
secrecy rates using random and optimal beam selections. For Alice, Bob, and Eve, a subset of 32
beams are chosen from the 40 dominant beams for the 32 RF chains exploited at each terminal. As
expected, we observe that the optimal beam selection only achieves a slightly higher secrecy rate than
that of the random selection. The performance of the optimal beam selection therefore serves as an
ideal upper bound for benchmarking as acquiring the entire channel matrix with a limited number of
RF chains is challenging if not impossible.
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Fig. 8. Ergodic achievable secrecy rate and the corresponding upper bound at low SNRs (Mt = 4, Mr = 96, and Me = 16).
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Fig. 9. Ergodic achievable secrecy rate and the corresponding upper bound at high SNRs (Mt = 4, Me = 8, and γ0 = 30 dB).
Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 compare the ergodic achievable secrecy rate and the derived upper bound versus
Lt at low and high SNRs, respectively. We set Nt = 512, φ = 0.9 and η = 0.1. The analytical results,
which are obtained by applying Propositions 1–3 to Theorem 1, are shown to be accurate compared
to the numerical results. We observe that the secrecy rate first increases and then decreases with Lt.
As indicated in Section II, the secrecy rate bonus arises from the mismatch of the sparsity patterns Ut
and Et with size Lt. Given a fixed Nt and as Lt increases, this mismatch, in terms of the number of
non-overlapped beams, first increases when Ut and Et contain more dominant beams. Then as Lt → Nt,
however, both sets Ut and Et tend to entirely overlap with each other because both contain almost all
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Fig. 10. Ergodic achievable secrecy rate gap at low SNRs (Nt = 512, Mt = 4, Mr = 192 Me = 16, and φ = 0.9).
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Fig. 11. Ergodic achievable secrecy rate gap at high SNRs (Nt = 512, Mt = 4, Mr = 32 Me = 12, and γ0 = 25 dB).
the transmit beams, and hence the mismatch vanishes. In addition, the optimal L∗t = 165 obtained
using Lemma 1 is also verified to be accurate in the simulation results.
Fig. 10 evaluates the ergodic achievable secrecy rate of the system under different levels of sparsity
at low SNRs. As indicated in Corollary 1, their difference in terms of secrecy rate depends only on
the values of ρ and η, regardless of SNR. This is because the mismatch between the sparsity patterns
of Bob’s and Eve’s channels are determined only by the parameters ρ and η. Using (38), secrecy
rate gaps ∆RLS of {(ρ1, η1), (ρ2, η2)} and {(ρ2, η2), (ρ3, η3)} are calculated respectively as 1.6103 and
0.5881 bits/s/Hz. This calculation matches the numerical results in the figure by comparing with the
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Fig. 13. Ergodic achievable secrecy rate versus ρ and η at low SNRs (Nt = 512, Mt = 4, Mr = 192 Me = 16, and φ = 0.9).
exact ergodic achievable secrecy rate. Fig. 11 shows the ergodic achievable secrecy rate gaps versus
φ at high SNRs. Similarly, the secrecy rate gaps ∆RHS obtained from (39) are 1.7513 and 1.3684
bits/s/Hz, which perfectly coincide with the considered cases.
Fig. 12(a) and Fig. 12(b) display the contours of the metrics, χL in (33) and χH in (34). Larger
χL (χH) means better secrecy performance can be achieved. This figure shows that both χL and χH
decrease with η, which conforms our observation that sparsity in the power domain always contributes
to secure communication. Smaller η means that the nondominant beams degrade more significantly
compared to the dominant ones. In this way, the mismatch between the sparsity patterns U and E
25
becomes more pronounced, leading to higher secrecy rate. On the other hand, there exists an optimal
value, ρ∗, which statistically provides the optimal mismatch between the sparsity patters and achieves
the largest χL (χH). The optimal ρ
∗ increases with η as indicated in (41). Similar observations can be
obtained from Fig. 13, which shows the secrecy rate versus ρ and η at low SNRs. In fact, the curves in
Fig. 12(a) show the same performance as the contours of the 3D plot in Fig. 13, because the secrecy
rate monotonically increases with χL. Comparing the two cases with γ0 = 2 and 5 dB in Fig. 13, we
observe that the rate bonus due to the channel sparsity is determined only by the parameters ρ and η,
regardless of SNR as indicated in Corollary 1.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a secure communication scheme leveraging the spatial sparsity of the
mm-Wave massive MIMO channel. Confidential signals are transmitted over the dominant beams of
Bob’s channel while AN is injected onto the nondominant beams. We derived two upper bounds for
the ergodic achievable secrecy rate and quantitatively characterized the contribution of the sparsity as
an additive secrecy rate bonus. The rate bonus arises from uncertainty in the sparsity pattern of Bob’s
channel, which is unknown to Eve. We defined two metrics for the statistics of the channel sparsity and
analyzed the impact of sparsity in the angle and power domains on the secrecy rate. In the angle domain,
we derived the optimal level of sparsity that achieves the highest secrecy rate. On the other hand, we
showed that the sparsity in the power domain always benefits secure communication. Interesting future
works include further extending our current results to a general scenario with imperfect CSI at receivers
for signal detection.
APPENDIX A
PRELIMINARY LEMMAS
The following two lemmas and their proofs will be used in Appendix B to prove Theorem 1.
Lemma 2. For Gˆ = [G(i, j)]i∈U¯r ,j /∈Ut in (11) whose columns follow CN (0, ηIMr), we have[
(1−φ)P
(Nt−Lt)σ2n
GˆGˆH+IMr
]−1
a.s.−−→
(
1− F(α, β)
4αβ
)
IMr , (45)
where α, β, and F(·, ·) are respectively defined in (18), (19), and (20) in Theorem 1.
Proof. Applying the Central Limit Theorem, we have 1
(Nt−Lt)ηGˆGˆ
H a.s.−−→ IMr for large Nt. This con-
vergence is preserved for continuous matrix functions according to the Continuous Mapping Theorem
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[45], yielding that
(
(1−φ)P
(Nt−Lt)σ2n GˆGˆ
H+IMr
)−1
almost surely converges to a diagonal matrix with equal
diagonal entries. Combining with the result in [46, Eq. (1.16)],
1
Mr
Tr
((
(1−φ)P
(Nt−Lt)σ2n
GˆGˆH+IMr
)−1)
a.s.−−→ 1− F(α, β)
4αβ
, (46)
we arrive at (45).
Lemma 3. For Hˆ = [H(i, j)]i∈E¯r ,j /∈Ut in (13), we have(
HˆHˆH
)−1 a.s.−−→ 1
(a−Me)bIMe, (47)
where a and b are respectively defined in (21) and (22) in Theorem 1.
Proof. Denoting hj as the jth column of submatrix [H(i, j)]i∈E¯r,∀j , we can decompose the matrix
HˆHˆH as
HˆHˆH =
∑
j /∈Ut,j∈Et
hjh
H
j +
∑
j /∈Ut,j /∈Et
hjh
H
j = H1H
H
1 +H2H
H
2 , (48)
where H1 , [H(i, j)]i∈E¯r ,j /∈Ut,j∈Et, and H2 , [H(i, j)]i∈E¯r ,j /∈Ut,j /∈Et . Under the assumption of large
Nt and Lt, there are asymptotically
Lt(Nt−Lt)
Nt
columns in H1 and
(Nt−Lt)2
Nt
columns in H2. Then, we
have H1H
H
1 ∼WMe
(
Lt(Nt−Lt)
Nt
, IMe
)
and H2H
H
2 ∼ WMe
(
(Nt−Lt)2
Nt
, ηIMe
)
, where Wm(n,Σ) denotes an
m × m Wishart matrix with n degrees of freedom and Σ is the covariance matrix of each column.
Strictly speaking, the distribution of HˆHˆH is complicated and intractable. However, by applying the
result in [12], [47] and according to the decomposition in (48), it follows that HˆHˆH can be accurately
approximated as a Wishart matrix, i.e., HˆHˆH ∼ WMe(a, bIMe), where parameters a and b are chosen
such that the first two moments of both sides in (48) are identical, leading to
ab =
Lt(Nt − Lt)
Nt
+ η
(Nt − Lt)2
Nt
, (49)
and
ab2 =
Lt(Nt − Lt)
Nt
+ η2
(Nt − Lt)2
Nt
. (50)
Solving (49) and (50), we obtain a and b respectively in (21) and (22), and get the derived result in
(47) by applying the propery in [48, Eq. (29)] of the Wishart matrix HˆHˆH ∼ WMe(a, bIMe) with large
a.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We first recall the following lemma from [12, Lemma 1].
Lemma 4. The ergodic achievable secrecy rate of Bob is given by
RS = [RU − CE]+, (51)
where RU is the ergodic achievable rate of Bob and CE is the ergodic capacity between Alice and
Eve seeking to decode the information sent to Bob.
Then, using Lemmas 2-3 in Appendix A, we prove Theorem 1 by deriving RU and CE separately.
The correlation matrices of x˜V and nAN are first given by
CX = E
{
x˜V x˜
H
V
}
= E
{
WssHWH
}
=
φP
Mt
IMt , (52)
and
CAN = E
{
nANn
H
AN
}
=
(1− φ)P
Nt − Lt INt−Lt , (53)
respectively, where we use the result in (8) and W =
√
φP
Mt
IMt . Then, according to (11) and by
substituting (52) and (53), the ergodic achievable rate of Bob can be expressed as
RU =E
{
log2
∣∣∣∣IMr + G¯CXG¯H (GˆCANGˆH + σ2nIMr)−1∣∣∣∣} (54)
=E
{
log2
∣∣∣∣∣IMr+ φPMtσ2n G¯G¯H
[
(1−φ)P
(Nt−Lt)σ2n
GˆGˆH+IMr
]−1∣∣∣∣∣
}
(55)
=E
{
log2
∣∣∣∣IMr+ φPMtσ2n
(
1− F(α, β)
4αβ
)
G¯G¯H
∣∣∣∣} (56)
=E
{
log2
∣∣∣∣IMt+ φPMtσ2n
(
1− F(α, β)
4αβ
)
G¯HG¯
∣∣∣∣} (57)
= log2
∣∣∣∣IMt + MrφPMtσ2n
(
1− F(α, β)
4αβ
)
IMt
∣∣∣∣ , (58)
where (56) applies Lemma 2 in Appendix A, (57) applies the equality |I+AB| = |I+BA|, and (58)
comes from the fact that 1
Mr
G¯HG¯ almost surely converges to IMt for large Mr. Thus, RU in (16) is
directly obtained from (58).
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On the other hand, according to (13), the ergodic capacity of Eve is expressed as
CE = E
{
log2
∣∣∣∣IMe + H¯CXH¯H (HˆCANHˆH)−1∣∣∣∣} (59)
= E
{
log2
∣∣∣∣IMe + φ(Nt − Lt)(1 − φ)Mt H¯H¯H
(
HˆHˆH
)−1∣∣∣∣} (60)
= E
{
log2
∣∣∣∣IMe + φ(Nt − Lt)(1− φ)Mt(a−Me)bH¯H¯H
∣∣∣∣} (61)
= E
{
log2
∣∣∣∣IMt + φ(Nt − Lt)(1− φ)Mt(a−Me)bH¯HH¯
∣∣∣∣} , (62)
where (60) uses (52) and (53), and (61) applies Lemma 3 in Appendix A. In (62), LtMt
Nt
columns of H¯
follow the distribution CN (0, IMe) and the remaining (Nt−Lt)MtNt columns follow CN (0, ηIMe). Thus,
H¯HH¯ converges almost surely to a diagonal matrix with LtMt
Nt
diagonal entries equal to Me and the
remaining
(Nt−Lt)Mt
Nt
diagonal entries equal to ηMe. This further yields the derived result in (17) from
(62).
Finally, the ergodic achievable secrecy rate in (15) is obtained by substituting (16) and (17) into
(51).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Substituting (24) and (31) into (15) of Theorem 1, the ergodic achievable secrecy rate at low SNR
can be expressed as
RLS=Mt
[
log2
(
1+
MrφP
Mtσ2n
)
−ρ log2
(
1+
φMe
(1−φ)Mt[η+(1−η)ρ]
)
−(1−ρ) log2
(
1+
φMeη
(1− φ)Mt[η+(1−η)ρ]
)]+
(63)
≤Mt
[
log2
(
1+
MrφP
Mtσ2n
)
−ρ log2
φMe
(1−φ)Mt [η+(1−η)ρ]−(1−ρ) log2
φMeη
(1−φ)Mt[η+(1−η)ρ]
]+
.
(64)
Considering a scenario with a powerful eavesdropper, i.e., Me ≫Mt, an upper bound for RLS is given
in (64). After some basic manipulations, the derived result in (36) is obtained.
By substituting (26) and (31) into (15), the ergodic achievable secrecy rate at high SNR can be
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expressed as
RHS =Mt
log2
1+ Mrφ
Mt(1−φ)η
(
1− Mr
Nt(1−ρ)
)
−ρ log2(1+ φMe(1−φ)Mt [η+(1−η)ρ]
)
−(1−ρ) log2
(
1+
φMeη
(1−φ)Mt[η+(1−η)ρ]
)]+
(65)
≤Mt
log2
1 + Mrφ
Mt(1−φ)η
(
1− Mr
Nt(1−ρ)
)
−ρ log2 φMe(1−φ)Mt [η+(1−η)ρ]
−(1−ρ) log2
φMeη
(1−φ)Mt[η+(1−η)ρ]
]+
(66)
=Mt
log2
1 + Mrφ
Mt(1−φ)η
(
1− Mr
Nt(1−ρ)
)
−log2 φMe(1−φ)Mt+log2
(
ηρ−1 [η+(1−η)ρ]
)+ . (67)
Similar to the low SNR case, an upper bound for RHS is obtained in (66) and (67) by considering
Me ≫ Mt. Furthermore, by adopting the condition of Mr ≫ Mt to guarantee a positive secrecy rate,
the upper bound in (37) is obtained.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We prove Lemma 1 by deriving the derivatives of χL and χH w.r.t. ρ. For χL in (33), the first
derivative w.r.t. ρ is expressed as
∂χL
∂ρ
= ηρ−1
(
1− η + ln η [η + (1− η)ρ]
)
. (68)
By forcing ∂χL
∂ρ
= 0, we obtain ρ∗ in (41), which is a saddle point of χL. Then we show that this saddle
point maximizes χL by checking its second derivative for two separate cases. The second derivative is
given as
∂2χL
∂ρ2
= ηρ−1 ln η
(
2− 2η + ln η [η + (1− η)ρ]
)
. (69)
1) For η ∈ [0.2032, 1), it can be easily verified that ∂2χL
∂ρ2
≤ 0 for ρ ∈
[
Mt
Nt
, 1
]
. Thus χL is a convex
function w.r.t. ρ which means that the saddle point ρ∗ in (41) achieves the optimum of χL.
2) For η ∈ (0, 0.2032), it can be shown that ∂χL
∂ρ
> 0 for ρ ∈
[
Mt
Nt
, ρ∗
)
and ∂χL
∂ρ
< 0 for ρ ∈ (ρ∗, 1].
Hence, ρ∗ in (41) also achieves the largest χL in this case.
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For χH in (34), the derivative w.r.t. ρ is
∂χH
∂ρ
=
ηρ−2(
1−ρ−Mr
Nt
)2 [ln(1−ρ)[η+(1−η)ρ](1−ρ−MrNt
)
+(1−η)(1−ρ)2+Mr
Nt
(2ρ+2η−2ρη−1)
]
. (70)
Generally, ∂χH
∂ρ
> 0 for small ρ while ∂χH
∂ρ
< 0 for large ρ. Using the fact Mr
Nt
→ 0 for a large Nt in
(70), we have
∂χH
∂ρ
→ ηρ−2
(
1− η + ln η [η + (1− η)ρ]
)
=
1
η
∂χL
∂ρ
. (71)
According to χL, we thus have that ρ
∗ in (41) is also a saddle point that maximizes χH.
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